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INTRODUCTION
The real estate crisis has profoundly impacted homeowners and communi-
ties throughout the country.1 Individual homeowners have lost substantial
wealth as the value of their homes fell below the amount owed on the mort-
gage, and many families have lost homes to foreclosures and short sales. Com-
munities have suffered the impact of vacant homes,2 both on the quality of life
in neighborhoods, and on the value of other homes in the community.3 In the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the William S. Boyd School
of Law, UNLV. In full disclosure, I wrote two short papers for compensation for Mortgage
Resolution Partners, Inc. (MRP) to assess the legality of using eminent domain to condemn
mortgage notes in Nevada. The opinions expressed in this Essay, however, are my own and
not those of MRP. Thank you to Sara Gordon for your continued support. This Paper also
benefited from comments from participants of the Local Government Law Works in
Progress Conference at Marquette University School of Law and the State and Local
Government Law Cities in Recession panel at the 2013 AALS conference.
1 Scholars have developed a variety of economic and regulatory explanations for the hous-
ing bubble and collapse. This Essay does not attempt to advance that conversation. Instead,
this Essay describes one new attempt to address the negative impacts on homeowners and
communities. For a recent, comprehensive description of the various explanations for the
mortgage crisis, including the argument that the housing bubble was driven more by supply-
side than demand-side forces, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the
Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012).
2 John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41
IND. L. REV. 629, 633 (2008).
3 See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57,
58 (2006) (finding that foreclosures reduced nearby property values as a whole by an aver-
age of $159,000 per foreclosure in Chicago during 1997 and 1998.); see also DEBBIE
BOCIAN ET AL., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE SPILLOVER COSTS OF FORECLOSURES, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (2012) (finding that during the years 2007 to 2011, $1.95
trillion in property value has been lost or will be lost by residents who live near foreclosures,
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midst of this upheaval, governments at all levels—local, state, and federal—
have developed strategies and programs to help their constituencies cope with
the crisis.4
Many homeowners, meanwhile, are still struggling to pay the mortgage. If
a house is “underwater,” a homeowner must consider both the economics and
the morality of walking away from a house with a mortgage that far exceeds its
value, a practice known as “strategic default.”5 Nevadans are among those most
hard-hit by the mortgage crisis and have increasingly found strategic default an
acceptable option.6 At the same time, however, most Nevadans still see home-
ownership as a key feature of the American dream.7 And despite the sometimes
disappointing results of previous government attempts to mitigate the effects of
the housing crisis,8 fifty-five percent of Nevadans recently polled continue to
support government assistance in this area.9
This Essay describes a novel plan to address the effects of the housing
bubble and collapse on homeowners and cities. Under this approach, local gov-
ernments would use the power of eminent domain to condemn and purchase
mortgage notes. Most, if not all, of these notes would be ones that originally
financed the purchase of a home and are now burdened by a mortgage whose
amount far exceeds the present value of the home. After the exercise of eminent
domain, the local government would own the note. The borrower could con-
tinue to make the same monthly payments, paid to the local government instead
of the previous creditor. In the alternative, the borrower could refinance the
over one-half of this loss is associated with communities of color, and that, on average,
families affected by nearby foreclosures have already lost or will lose $21,077 in household
wealth).
4 Other state and local interventions include creating outreach and counseling programs,
providing financial assistance to individual borrowers, facilitating legal assistance to home-
owners in the foreclosure process, reaching agreements with banks including settlements,
legislating moratoria on foreclosures, cracking down on foreclosure “rescue” businesses, and
creating mediation processes. See Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the
Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 357-
65 (2011).
5 See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 972 (2010) (arguing that
many underwater borrowers do not strategically default to avoid the shame associated with
foreclosure and because of a fear of the consequences of foreclosure).
6 See, e.g., Buck Wargo, In Nevada, 23 Percent Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure Could
Afford Payments (Jan. 25, 2011, 9:22 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jan/25/
nevada-23-percent-who-lost-homes-foreclosure-could/; see also NEV. ASS’N OF REALTORS,
NEVADA’S FACE OF FORECLOSURE: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT NEVADA’S HOUSING CRISIS 4
(2012), available at http://www.faceofforeclosure.com/images/SGS-NVAR-12-FoFReport3-
WebQuality-FINAL.pdf (“Forty-five percent of all Nevada residents surveyed said strategic
default is an acceptable, logical financial decision while 45% said homeowners should not
strategically default and they have a legal and ethical obligation to pay their mortgage if they
are able.”).
7 Id. at 10 (noting that seventy-nine percent of people who had experienced foreclosure
think housing is a key feature of the American Dream).
8 Fifty-two percent of Nevada residents believe government foreclosure prevention pro-
grams are not really having an impact. Id.
9 Id. at 14. To illustrate, however, the diversity of opinion and the difficulty of this issue,
thirty percent of homeowners who have experienced foreclosure say that government should
not step in to help. Id.
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note in the private market based on current housing market values.10 After refi-
nancing based on current housing values, the value of the house could exceed
the amount borrowed—thereby changing its status from “underwater” to a
house with some equity. Moreover, the borrower would most likely pay less in
monthly mortgage payments because those payments would be based on a
lower housing value and a resulting lower mortgage loan.
A handful of local governments around the country—including San Ber-
nardino County,11 and the cities of North Las Vegas,12 Sacramento,13 Berke-
ley,14 and Chicago15—have considered or are considering adopting this
eminent domain approach to mortgage notes. Many more have probably con-
sidered the possibility, though with less resulting media coverage. Not surpris-
ingly, the idea has been controversial. Some of the discussion covers ground
familiar to debates about eminent domain: whether the government is intruding
into an area best addressed by the private market, whether appropriate compen-
sation is being given to the underlying property owners, and whether the public
judgment of a local government has been overwhelmed by private interests and
corporate agendas.16
Much of the concern about this application of eminent domain arises in
response to the traditional use of eminent domain, which typically involves the
10 See FAQ, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/
faqs (last visited May 2, 2013).
11 See Mark Muckenfuss, San Bernardino: County Steps Forward on Housing Idea, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (June 30, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.pe.com/local-news/san-bernardino-
county/san-bernardino-county-headlines-index/20120630-san-bernardino-county-steps-for-
ward-on-housing-idea.ece. San Bernardino later declined to adopt the plan. See Alejandro
Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://
articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-20130125.
12 Chris Sieroty, North Las Vegas to Consider the Use of Eminent Domain to Save Homes,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Mar. 6, 2013, 2:24 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/north-
las-vegas-consider-use-eminent-domain-save-homes.
13 See Hudson Sangree, Sacramento Area Officials Explore Using Eminent Domain to Aid
Underwater Homeowners, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 11, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.
sacbee.com/2012/08/11/4715792/sacramento-area-officials-explore.html.
14 See Andrew S. Ross, Eminent Domain Plan Gaining Support, S.F. CHRON. (July 31,
2012, 4:58 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/bottomline/article/Berkeley-eyes-eminent-
domain-for-mortgages-3751091.php.
15 See Micah Maidenberg, Alderman Wants To Explore Fighting Foreclosures with Eminent
Domain, CHICAGOREALESTATEDAILY.COM (July 30, 2012), http://www.chicagorealestate
daily.com/article/20120730/CRED03/120739989/alderman-wants-to-explore-fighting-fore-
closures-with-eminent-domain.
16 See, e.g., Steven Greenhut, Eminent Domain is Bad Ploy for Underwater Mortgages,
BLOOMBERG.COM (June 28, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-28/
eminent-domain-is-bad-ploy-for-underwater-mortgages.html (arguing that compensation to
mortgage holders under eminent domain would be insufficient, the market can address this
problem on its own, large financiers of the eminent domain project would benefit at the
expense of smaller investors who could purchase individual homes at short sale and in fore-
closure, and private firms may be less likely to lend in these areas in the future); Felix
Salmon, Why You Can’t Use Eminent Domain to Buy Performing Mortgages, REUTERS (July
9, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/07/09/why-you-cant-use-eminent-
domain-to-buy-performing-mortgages/ (supporting the idea of using eminent domain to buy
defaulted properties, but opposing Mortgage Resolution Partners’ idea of buying the
mortgages).
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taking of real estate. The overwhelming majority of legal precedent, as well as
common wisdom about the propriety of eminent domain, is shaped by its appli-
cation to real property. We are usually concerned about the taking of a house,17
the propriety and viability of a proposed redevelopment project,18 or the loss of
a community.19 These applications of eminent domain to tangible property
have, understandably, shaped the evolution and criticism of the doctrine. More-
over, the underlying tangible property typically has significant personal value
to the owner, magnifying the intensity of the owner’s response and the level of
public disapproval.
Conversely, this proposed use of eminent domain involves the taking of
mortgage notes. Here, the object of the eminent domain action is a piece of
paper, a note held by faceless corporate investors.20 These notes are not physi-
cally held in a vault or at the local bank, but in securitized trusts.21 There is no
compelling story to tell of raising children in a home, or of the dislocation of
long-time residents of a community. Thus, the absence of an emotional, fact-
driven narrative might remove some of the long-standing objections to the use
of eminent domain in this novel context.
17 Susette Kelo was the owner of a small pink house in New London, Connecticut that was
seized using the power of eminent domain, and a plaintiff in the 2005 Supreme Court case,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
18 See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory Taking’s
Anti-Subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 IND. L. REV. 97, 97
(2009).
19 Eminent domain “can entail, as it did in this case, intangible losses, such as severance or
personal attachments to one’s domicile and neighborhood and the destruction of an organic
community of a most unique and irreplaceable character.” Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004). See also Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public
Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1006 (“The notoriety [of Poletown] stemmed from the
massive scale and seeming callousness of Detroit’s use of eminent domain: destroying an
entire neighborhood and condemning the homes of 4,200 people, as well as numerous busi-
nesses, churches, and schools so that the land could be transferred to General Motors for the
construction of a new factory.”).
20 The nature of the property—a note within a securitized bundle of notes—is another
troublesome feature of the debate. It is a hard enough task to determine whether the use of
eminent domain is legal or wise. Securitization adds another complication, both because it is
complex and because it adds several layers of confusion in determining who owns the under-
lying property—the note. See, e.g., Roy D. Oppenheim & Jacquelyn K. Trask-Rahn, Decon-
structing the Black Magic of Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-Backed Securitization
Process Is Hurting the Banking Industry’s Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense
for a Foreclosure Defense, 41 STETSON L. REV. 745 (2012); Adam J. Levitin & Tara Two-
mey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011) (examining the problems created by
mortgage securitization).
21 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 11. (“The traditional portfolio lending relation-
ship . . . is now the exception in the home mortgage market. Instead, mortgages are generally
financed through securitization. Securitization is a financing method involving the issuance
of securities against a dedicated cashflow stream, such as mortgage payments, that is isolated
from other creditors’ claims. Securitization links consumer borrowers with capital market
financing, potentially lowering the cost of mortgage capital. It also allows financing institu-
tions to avoid the credit risk, interest-rate risk, and liquidity risk associated with holding the
mortgages on their own books.”).
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Like many states, Nevada was especially hard hit by the mortgage crisis.
This Essay focuses on Nevada law in particular, however, because Nevada was
one of several states that enacted strident legislative and constitutional reforms
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.22
Despite these reforms, however, there is no indication that the public or the
legislature considered the condemnation of mortgage notes in making changes
to Nevada law following Kelo.23 Similarly, while there was a national conver-
sation between 2005 and 2010 about how states ought to respond to the Kelo
decision, these conversations focused on the traditional use of eminent domain
power in regards to real estate, not the condemnation of mortgage notes.24
Given this background, Nevada cities might now wonder whether condemning
mortgage notes is a proper exercise of their eminent domain power.
While local governments have many incentives to act to help individual
homeowners as well as entire communities in responding to the mortgage cri-
sis, local governments are understandably risk averse.25 They may question
whether they have the authority to condemn mortgage notes under the applica-
ble statutes and, if so, whether the condemnation is a valid public use. I believe
the answer to both questions is “yes.”
This is a complex topic, and one that would benefit from a book-length
treatment exploring the history of eminent domain, its past applications by local
governments, and a detailed treatment of the mortgage securitization market.
My goal in this Essay is considerably more modest. Though there are signifi-
cant policy debates surrounding this use of eminent domain, this Essay does not
attempt to discuss, in detail, the pros and cons of local intervention. Instead, the
Essay takes a decidedly pro-local stance and supports intervention by local
governments. This approach is premised, in part, on the conclusion that state
legislatures have not considered and therefore have not foreclosed local action
and, in part, on the observation that while state and national actors have dis-
cussed and instituted measures to ameliorate the effects of the housing crisis on
individuals and communities, local governments have had relatively fewer
opportunities to create meaningful change in this area. Although this Essay
does not elaborate on some of the details of the obstacles to local governments
using eminent domain to condemn mortgage notes, it notes the arguments and
presumes their significance: no governmental entity has used eminent domain
to condemn mortgage notes before, traditional concerns about the use of emi-
nent domain still affect the conversation, and precisely how the financial sector
22 See Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in Eminent
Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119, 1158 (2011); see generally Marc Mihaly & Turner
Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five
Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703 (2011).
23 For a recent description of Nevada’s eminent domain law, see Mark F. Bruce & Jonathan
D. Shipman, A Quick Review of Takings Law in Nevada in the Wake of Kelo, Pappas and the
People’s Initiative to Stop the Taking of our Land, 20 NEV. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 21.
24 See Mihaly & Smith, supra note 22, at 707–08.
25 Susan Rose-Ackerman notably described this limitation to local innovation and experi-
mentation stating that there is no property right in local government innovation. Therefore,
local governments will find it easier to copy successful efforts and local government officials
will find copying a safer path for reelection. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelec-
tion: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 604–05 (1980).
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would be affected and how it would react remain real questions. I remain hope-
ful, however, that local governments will choose to engage this national hous-
ing issue because of the potential this intervention has for breaking through the
housing market impasse in many communities.
To begin, Part I of this Essay will discuss the development of eminent
domain law in the state of Nevada, both before and after the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London. Specifically, the develop-
ment of eminent domain law in Nevada resulted from a backlash to the Court’s
interpretation of public use and was an attempt to restrict the government’s use
of the doctrine to take private property. Next, this section will examine the
authority of cities to exercise eminent domain power generally, as well as the
extent of this authority to condemn mortgage notes. Part II will then explain
why this novel use of the doctrine of eminent domain is appropriate at the local
level and why cities and other municipalities are better suited than the federal
government to use the power of eminent domain to assist struggling
homeowners.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
A. Reaction to the Kelo Decision in Nevada
The eminent domain doctrine is deceptively easy to state—private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.26 Moreover,
the term “public use” had been broadly construed and relatively stable for the
twenty years preceding the 2005 Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London.27 During that time, the public use requirement could be satisfied by
virtually any declaration by a local, state, or federal legislative body that a
proposed use of eminent domain would result in some social or economic pub-
lic benefit, including mere economic development.28 Though this definition
was tested in legislatures and courts before Kelo, lower court decisions—par-
ticularly those applying the U.S. Constitution—supported this broad view.29
Despite its expansive definition, however, the use of eminent domain was
neither easy nor uncontroversial before Kelo. State courts struggled with vari-
26 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005).
27 In Kelo, the city of New London used eminent domain to acquire a number of parcels,
including the home of Susette Kelo, to facilitate the development of a mixed-use office,
retail, and residential center. The city’s justification for using eminent domain rested on the
potential economic development benefits of a successful center. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld this use of eminent domain for economic development, but the mixed-use develop-
ment was never built. Id. at 489–90.
28 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63–65
(1986). This broad view of public use supports the view that the legislature’s determination
of public use should be given great deference by courts. Id.
29 Two cases I use in my Property class to demonstrate this principle are Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) and Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1984). In
Berman, the Court held that “the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclu-
sive. . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. In Midkiff, the Court affirmed the Hawaii legislature’s
conclusion that using eminent domain to address limited land ownership in the state was a
valid public use. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231–32.
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ous legal and policy implications of the doctrine, including the use of economic
development as the rationale to support public use.30 One noteworthy, and
widely-discussed, example of this struggle occurred in a Michigan Supreme
Court case upholding the bulldozing of an entire community to create an auto-
mobile plant.31 While the majority emphasized the project’s significant public
purpose,32 the dissent highlighted the project’s effect on the neighborhood’s
“elderly, mostly retired” residents33 and the pressure General Motors put on the
city of Detroit to complete the project.34
Although Kelo provided some guidance to lower courts when it reaffirmed
a broad interpretation of public use in a 5–4 decision,35 the decision also
ignited a national backlash in response to its holding that the government could
take property from one private entity and transfer it to another private entity
under the guise of eminent domain and economic development.36 Popular opin-
ion seemed largely aligned with Justice O’Connor’s observation in Kelo that,
by adopting such a broad view of eminent domain, “[n]othing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shop-
ping mall, or any farm with a factory.”37
This national eminent domain conversation is crucial to understanding the
development of Nevada eminent domain law. Before 2005, Nevada law
reflected a commonly held, broad view of public use. The Nevada Supreme
Court, as recently as 2003, had upheld a broad interpretation of public use that
included economic development, stating that “[t]he Nevada Legislature has
clearly defined economic redevelopment as a public purpose.”38 Similarly,
before 2005, the Nevada Constitution contained a short and fairly typical
description of eminent domain:
Sec. 8. Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions; jeopardy; rights of victims of
crime; due process of law; eminent domain.
. . .
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
having been first made, or secured, except in cases of war, riot, fire, or great public
peril, in which case compensation shall be afterward made.39
30 The Nevada Supreme Court, for example, upheld the taking of property in downtown Las
Vegas for the construction of a parking garage for the growing Fremont Experience project.
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 11–12 (Nev.
2003).
31 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458–59 (Mich.
1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
32
“We hold this project is warranted on the basis that its significance for the people of
Detroit and the state has been demonstrated.” Id. at 460.
33 Id. at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 481. “Virtually the only discordant sounds of dissent have come from the minuscule
minority of citizens most profoundly affected by this case, the Poletown residents whose
neighborhood has been destroyed.” Id. at 482.
35 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
36 See, e.g., George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2008).
37 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
38 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 5 (Nev.
2003) (upholding use of eminent domain).
39 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
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After the Kelo decision in 2005, however, in response to concerns about
government overreaching through eminent domain actions, as well as through
other, more insidious land use regulations, eminent domain opponents led suc-
cessful efforts across the nation, including in Nevada, to amend state constitu-
tions and enact legislation to restrict the practice.40 In Nevada, the suggested
amendments were among the most restrictive in the nation, with significant
proposed changes to both the state statute and the state constitution.41 A suc-
cessful ballot initiative (the People’s Initiative to Stop the Taking of Our Land
or “PISTOL”) was passed by voters in 2006 and 2008 and amended the Nevada
Constitution to add Section 22 to Article 1. The amendment stated that
“[p]ublic use shall not include the direct or indirect transfer of any interest in
property taken in an eminent domain proceeding from one private party to
another private party.”42 This amendment survived a court challenge43 as well
as later attempts at modification by the legislature and others44 who were con-
cerned that the amendment was overly restrictive.45 Its survival reflects the
strong sentiment—held by many legislators and the general public—against the
traditional use of eminent domain.
B. Authority and Public Use
Unlike the traditional use of eminent domain, which prohibits private-to-
private transfers, the condemnation of mortgage notes appears viable under
40 Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2100, 2103–04 (2009) (noting that “the majority of the newly enacted post-Kelo
reform laws are likely to be ineffective” and offering “a tentative explanation for the often
ineffective nature of post-Kelo reform: widespread political ignorance that enables state and
federal legislators to pass off primarily cosmetic laws as meaningful reforms”); See also
Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to
Kelo, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 237, 244 (2009).
41 Nevada received a B+ by the property-rights oriented Castle Coalition and would likely
have received an A if the Constitutional amendment had been finalized by the time of the
Castle Coalition report. CASTLE COAL., 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT
DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE Kelo 32 (2007), available at http://www.castlecoali-
tion.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf.
42 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 22, cl. 1.
43 The PISTOL initiative survived a court challenge that involved more than one subject.
The court merely struck the portions of the initiative that did not address eminent domain
directly. Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1250 (Nev.
2006).
44 The Amendment stated that property condemned by eminent domain must be put to a
valid public use in five years or the ownership would revert to the original owner. Id. at
1239. Transportation officials argued that the short five-year window would be insufficient
for road projects and argued for a fifteen-year window. See Minutes of the S. Comm. on
Judiciary, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. 8–9 (Nev. 2007).
45 In 2007, state and local legislatures worked with the PISTOL ballot initiative authors to
create an alternative constitutional amendment that would, in part, soften some of the origi-
nal PISTOL initiative provisions first approved by voters in 2006. See LEGISLATIVE COUN-
SEL BUREAU, SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION, 74th Sess., at 151–52 & 207 (Nev. 2007)
(describing Assembly Bill 102 to amend the Nevada Revised Statutes and Assembly Joint
Resolution 3 to amend the Nevada Constitution). The proposal was approved by the Nevada
legislature during its 2007 and 2009 sessions, but failed as a ballot measure in 2010. State-
wide Ballot Results, NEV. SECRETARY ST., http://www.nvsos.gov/SilverState2010gen/Bal-
lots.aspx (last visited May 2, 2013).
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Nevada law. In order to exercise eminent domain to condemn mortgage notes,
two conditions must be met. First, cities must have the power to exercise emi-
nent domain generally; in other words, the cities must have the authority to act.
Second, the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use must extend to
the taking of mortgage notes. The Nevada eminent domain statute seems to
satisfy both of these related conditions.
First, a city must have the authority to exercise eminent domain. A core
principle of state and local government law is that cities have no “inherent”
legal status; they are created by states.46 Therefore, a city’s authority to act may
be broadened or limited by state legislation. These broad and narrow views are
roughly captured in descriptions of states as “home rule” or “Dillon’s rule”
states. Cities in home rule states generally rule themselves unless expressly
prohibited, while cities in Dillon’s rule states look for specific authorization.47
While these are not precise categories or descriptions, and the actual exercise of
local power often defies these oversimplified categories, Nevada is a Dillon’s
rule state,48 and its cities therefore require specific authorization to exercise
local powers.49 This authority is clearly found in NRS 37.010(1)(c), which
states:
[T]he right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public
uses:
. . .
(c) County, city, town and school district activities. Public buildings and
grounds for the use of any county, incorporated city or town, or school district, reser-
voirs, water rights, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches or pipes for conducting water
for the use of the inhabitants of any county, incorporated city or town, for draining
any county, incorporated city or town, for raising the banks of streams, removing
obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels, for
roads, streets and alleys, and all other public purposes for the benefit of any county,
incorporated city or town, or the inhabitants thereof.50
While Nevada cities may therefore feel confident in their authority to con-
demn land under eminent domain for public use under the statute, they may
still question whether the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use
extends to mortgage notes. Adding to this uncertainty, the language of the
Nevada statute does not refer to the condemnation of mortgage notes but
instead refers explicitly to real property. For example, the statute requires the
plaintiff to name the “owners, occupants and claimants of the property” as
defendants.51 Of course, there is no “occupant” of a mortgage note, and the
corresponding defendant would be the trustee of the trust that holds the note. A
similar provision states that an eminent domain petition must contain a descrip-
tion of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether it includes the whole
46 See, e.g., City of Reno v. Cnty. of Washoe, 580 P.2d 460, 462 (Nev. 1978).
47 For a general description of home rule and Dillon’s rule distinctions, see GERALD E.
FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 36–38
(2008).
48 Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 65 P.2d 133, 136 (Nev. 1937).
49 Id. NRS 37.0095 provides that any agency or political subdivision of the state can exer-
cise eminent domain power. NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.0095 (2011).
50 NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(1)(c) (emphasis added).
51 Id. § 37.070(1)(c).
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or only part of an entire parcel or tract.52 Again, the reference to “land” reflects
the more traditional use of eminent domain.53
Furthermore, the statute has a list of enumerated local government public
uses, which does not include mortgage notes.54 For example, the statute specifi-
cally mentions aqueducts, flumes and ditches.55 One could argue that the legis-
lature intended only to allow those uses listed in the statute, but prohibit others,
including mortgage notes, that it did not list.56 However, one also needs to
consider the final portion of this local government section: “and all other pub-
lic purposes for the benefit of any county, incorporated city or town, or the
inhabitants thereof.”57 Had it intended to significantly limit the scope of public
use, or to limit it to the uses listed in the statute, the legislature could have
included more limiting language, as other states have done. For example, Ari-
zona contains a similar laundry list of public uses but includes specific refer-
ence to legislative authority limiting local action.58 Similarly, while the
Montana eminent domain statute includes forty-five categories of public uses,59
none of the provisions include Nevada’s “all other public purposes” provi-
sion.60 Therefore, even given its limited enumerated uses, the last sentence of
this section, encompassing “all other public purposes” into the definition of
public use, suggests that the legislature intended a broad reading of public
use.61
52 Id. § 37.070(1)(f).
53 The statute provides that “[t]he fee simple or lesser estate in real property, and any other
property, are subject to” eminent domain. Id. § 37.020(1) (emphasis added). In one case,
property owners were allowed just compensation for the value of the benefit of a restrictive
covenant on adjacent land that was taken by eminent domain. Meredith v. Washoe Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 435 P.2d 750, 752 (Nev. 1968).
54 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(1)(a)–(o). One study of post-Kelo legislation identified
nineteen states, including Nevada, with statutes employing this inclusionary drafting
approach. This approach clarifies public use with respect to activities important to individual
states, and sometimes excludes certain activities as public use. Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A.
Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A Potpourri of Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799, 804 (2008).
55 NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(c).
56 One principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is that the
statement of one thing is to the exclusion of another. See, e.g., In re Estate of Prestie, 138
P.3d 520, 524 (Nev. 2006) (applying the principle to the construction of a will).
57 NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(c). The Utah statute has a list similar to Nevada’s and includes
a provision authorizing “all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or
its inhabitants . . . .” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501(3)(f) (West 2012).
58
“Roads, streets, and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of a county, city, town
or village, or the inhabitants thereof, which is authorized by the legislature.” ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1111(6) (2012).
59 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-102 (2011).
60 A similar provision in the Montana statute authorizing local governments to use eminent
domain states that eminent domain can be used for the public use of “roads, streets, alleys,
controlled-access facilities, and other publicly owned buildings and facilities for the benefit
of a county, city, or town or the inhabitants of a county, city, or town . . . .” Id. § 70-30-
102(7).
61 NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(c). Some might be tempted, erroneously, to measure public
use by focusing on the number of mortgages taken under the plan. To the extent that the plan
takes only ten mortgage notes, some might regard the plan as insufficiently “public.” Simi-
larly, if the plan takes 10,000 notes in Nevada, it would appear on its face to have quite a
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Furthermore, although scholars and policy-makers have vigorously
debated the meaning of public use in the wake of the Kelo decision,62 that
debate has typically centered on developer-driven eminent domain actions in
which the developer, or another non-governmental entity, was awarded owner-
ship of the underlying property for new construction or redevelopment.63 As
noted above, and in response to the perceived impropriety of these types of
action, many states, including Nevada, passed statutes and constitutional
amendments to limit, or eliminate, these “private-to-private” transfers.64
Unlike traditional eminent domain actions, however, the plan to condemn
mortgage notes does not involve a private-to-private transfer. Under this
scheme, local governments would use eminent domain to purchase notes from
trustees. After the purchase, the homeowner could choose to refinance the
house by obtaining a mortgage from another lender based on the current market
value of the house. If the homeowner successfully refinances the house, the
local government would simply extinguish the note it obtained by eminent
domain upon payment by the new lender. If instead the homeowner does not
refinance, the local government would continue to hold the note it obtained by
eminent domain. In neither case would the government transfer the property—
here the underlying note—to a private party.
This proposed use of eminent domain is an admittedly unorthodox transac-
tion, but it is an entirely different transaction than states, like Nevada, passed
legislation to address. The amendments to the Nevada statute and Constitution
explicitly address transferring property from one private party to another pri-
vate party and explicitly prevent using eminent domain to achieve this result.65
A history of private-to-private transfers, many of which have been the subject
of traditional eminent domain litigation, support concern for these types of
transfers and corresponding amendments to curb them. Those types of transfers
are not at issue here. If the Nevada ballot initiatives had been intended to pre-
vent more than private-to-private transfers, those initiatives could have been
drafted differently—perhaps to ban eminent domain actions that were based
public reach. While this approach to the public question may be germane to the political
analysis, it does not seem appropriate for the legal analysis. Local government officials
should rightly be attentive to the magnitude of the housing crisis at the local level and how
many notes and neighborhoods should be targeted. It is appropriate for a local government to
debate whether it should target one or two neighborhoods ravaged by the housing crisis or it
should target neighborhoods throughout a city. The question of whether to implement the
plan in one neighborhood or ten is a political or strategic question about how exactly to
exercise the plan. As a legal question, however, public use would be satisfied regardless of
the number of neighborhoods targeted. Using eminent domain in one neighborhood to take
mortgage notes is little different than using eminent domain in one neighborhood to con-
demn a small street or right of way for public use. See e.g., id. § 37.070(1)(f) (statute
allowing state to condemn a small street or right of way for public use).
62 See, e.g., Mihaly & Turner, supra note 22.
63 Justice Kennedy expressed concern about developer-driven economic development
schemes in his Kelo concurrence. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490–91
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 22, cl. 1.
65 See id.
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solely on economic development, a ban that some states did enact.66 Instead,
the Nevada ballot initiatives focused on banning private-to-private transactions,
and there is no evidence to suggest that this non-traditional use of eminent
domain to condemn mortgage notes was intended to be included in that ban.
II. THE PROPRIETY OF LOCAL ACTION
While there is ongoing debate about the causes of the housing bubble and
subsequent market decline, few would argue that it has not had a devastating
effect on individuals, communities, and local governments. Individuals have
lost their homes to foreclosures and short sales, suffered losses to their credit
ratings that will make future borrowing difficult, and endured the uncertainty
and fear of owing far more on their houses than those houses are worth. Com-
munities have lost neighbors to foreclosure and subsequent dislocation, suf-
fered regional value declines, and endured the physical deterioration of vacant
homes.67 Local governments weathered the financial costs of financing ordi-
nary public services with a smaller population, as well as the increased services
needed in communities facing the physical and psychological impact of fore-
closure and widespread dislocation.68 While the national real estate crisis has
had significant local effects, local real estate lending also has distinctly national
characteristics.69 Given this national reach, the question of whether local gov-
ernments should act to help individuals and communities affected by the real
estate crisis raises complicated questions about the efficacy and propriety of
local action.
66 For recent discussions of direct democracy efforts, see Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Got-
tlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of the
Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727,
755–60 (2012) (discussing the efficacy of deliberative democracy); see also Julie M. Ches-
lik, Will Grassroots Democracy Solve the Government Fiscal Crisis?, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 625, 632 (2012) (highlighting the limitations of initiative and referendum to sound gov-
ernment decision making).
67 The Center for Responsible Lending found that the average cost to neighbors near fore-
closed houses was $21,077 over the span of years from 2007 to 2011. The total cost of
foreclosure will be even higher because this figure does not include the lost equity of the
family that has been foreclosed on, the loss of local tax revenue, vacant properties and
increased crime, or lower school performance by affected children. BOCIAN ET AL., supra
note 3, at 2.
68 Raymond H. Brescia et al., Crisis Management: Principles that Should Guide the Dispo-
sition of Federally Owned, Foreclosed Properties, 45 IND. L. REV. 305, 309 (2012). The
harms that individuals and communities suffered during the collapse of the housing bubble
also influence future decisions to buy homes. See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Iden-
tity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119,
131–32 (2012) (“In the context of the housing crisis, the emotional attachment to homeown-
ership and the larger cultural symbolism that feeds that attachment mean that the experiences
of families losing their houses through foreclosure can have tremendous emotional salience
for would-be buyers.”).
69 The national scope of residential mortgage lending is reflected in its regulation by
national banking and civil rights laws. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(2012) (requiring the disclosure of certain lending terms); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a) (2012) (requiring nondiscrimination based on race, national origin and other char-
acteristics in the conveyance of property).
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An eminent domain action is local. Eminent domain proceedings to con-
demn mortgage notes would be brought in district court in the county where the
property is located,70 and the local government could consolidate related emi-
nent domain actions into one suit.71 While local governments are “closer to the
people,” the question of whether issues are better addressed at the local level
versus the national level remains contested.72 The vast scope of the housing
and lending crisis suggests that local government may not be appropriately situ-
ated to address the needs of others—at the state, national, or international level.
On the other hand, it is clear that there are distinctly local components of the
mortgage crisis; that is, cities and states have experienced the crisis in different
ways. Professor Robert Hockett illustrates this local impact through a color-
coded map showing the concentration of underwater houses across the coun-
try.73 The map shows clear concentrations in cities throughout Nevada, Califor-
nia, Florida, and other states.74 To the extent that the spatial effects of the real
estate crisis are local, cities should be empowered to address these effects at the
local level.
While the use of eminent domain by cities to address the real estate and
foreclosure crisis is a new phenomenon, cities have used other tools to address
similar housing and lending issues. For example, local governments have
attempted to ameliorate some of the effects of the housing crisis by requiring
foreclosing banks to maintain vacant properties.75 States, including Nevada,
have required foreclosing lenders to participate in mediation with debtor home-
owners,76 or obtained large financial settlements against banks for wrongful
lending practices and used these settlements to fund housing efforts at the local
level.77 And states, including Nevada, have also amended foreclosure laws to
70 NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.060(1). The statute also moves eminent domain proceedings ahead
of general civil matters on the docket. Id. § 37.055.
71 Id. § 37.070(2) (2011) (“All parcels lying in the county and required for the same public
use may be included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but
the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the conveniences of parties. Each defen-
dant, at the defendant’s option, may have a separate trial.”).
72 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1400–02
(2012) (emphasizing the importance of federal intervention in local land use regulation).
73 Robert C. Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for
Underwater Mortgage Debt That Can Benefit Literally Everyone 11 (Cornell Law School:
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-64, 2012).
74 Id.
75 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.464(1) (describing the duty to maintain residential property
acquired at foreclosure). See also Benjamin Spillman, Ordinance Pressures Banks to Main-
tain Properties, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 8, 2011, at B1 (discussing Las Vegas ordinance
that would impose fines and possibly jail time for neglect of foreclosed properties); James
O’Toole, Banks Labeled “Slumlords” Over Foreclosure Neglect, CNNMONEY (Aug. 29,
2012, 10:11 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/29/real_estate/banks-slumlords/index.html
(describing efforts of Los Angeles City Attorney’s office to compel banks to maintain fore-
closed homes).
76 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.085, with id. § 107.086.
77 See Press Release, Office of the Nev. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Masto Announces
Two Historic Mortgage Servicing Foreclosure Settlements (Feb. 9, 2012) (estimating
Nevada’s share to be $1.5 billion in mortgage relief); Chris Sieroty, Banks Give Relief to
Homeowners, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 20, 2012, at D1 (reporting on settlement activity
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lessen the impact of, or wholly eliminate, deficiency judgments against
borrowers.78
Individuals and local governments are understandably frustrated by the
failure of the private market and of federal interventions79 to improve the hous-
ing market.80 The number of participants and diverging interests in the typical
securitization scheme makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reach an efficient
resolution with respect to individual loan decisions like whether to restructure
or foreclose a loan.81 And the disaggregation of property interests in the typical
securitization scheme adds to the impossibility of voluntary resolutions.82 At
the same time, investors have a limited ability to compel trustee action due to a
collective action problem.83 This eminent domain plan promotes alienability by
from Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup and Ally Financial
between March 1 and September 30, 2012).
78 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 40.455(3) (prohibiting deficiency judgments by financial insti-
tutions against owner occupier debtors who have not refinanced). Some attempts by cities to
address housing and lending issues have not been successful. For example, cities have
attempted to pass local ordinances to combat predatory lending. See generally Jonathan L.
Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 757, 757 (2007); Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the External-
ities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 355 (2006). See also Mayor of N.Y. v.
Council of N.Y., 780 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275–76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (invalidating New York
City ordinance that did not allow predatory lenders to do business with the city); see also
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 823 (Cal. 2005) (invalidating
Oakland’s ordinance regulating predatory lending). Courts determined that state legislators
impliedly intended to regulate predatory lending to the exclusion of local governments. See
id. (“We therefore conclude that through the enactment of [the state statute], the Legislature
has fully occupied the field of regulation of predatory tactics in home mortgages.”). Cities
have also attempted to use the Fair Housing Act to achieve similar results. See, e.g., Ngai
Pindell, The Fair Housing Act at Forty: Predatory Lending and the City as Plaintiff, 18 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 169, 170 (2009); Relman, supra note 2,
629–30 & n.10 (describing Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages,
Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. L08CV 062, 2008 WL 117894 (D. Md. Jan.
8, 2008)).
79 See, e.g., Alexander et al., supra note 4, at 342 (describing federal legislative responses
to the foreclosure crisis).
80 The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) has not turned around the Nevada
housing market. “Nevadans expressed a dim view of government programs such as the
Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP. Only 9 percent of those facing foreclo-
sure and 10 percent of all Nevadans said foreclosure prevention programs have helped.”
Hubble Smith, Divide Over Ethics of Strategic Default, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 27, 2012,
at D2.
81
“The contractual design of mortgage securitization effectively makes servicers principal-
less agents; there is no party with the ability and incentive to monitor a servicer’s actions.
Investors lack the information, capacity, and legal standing to effectively monitor servicer
performance, and tranching and insurance often remove their incentive to do so.” Levitin &
Twomey, supra note 20, at 7.
82 Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 165 (2012) (“The mortgages were diced into thousands of
pieces, transferred to trusts, securitized, sold to investors, rated triple-A by rating agencies
that had serious conflicts of interest and appeared not to know what they were doing, and
managed by mortgage servicers whose contractual rights and obligations made it impossible
for borrowers to renegotiate with lenders if the need arose.”).
83 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 62 (describing the collective action problem of
investors acting on loan servicers) (“It is difficult for investors to achieve these collective
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allowing local governments to purchase notes in securitized trusts that the trust-
ees themselves are not empowered to voluntarily transfer.84 Furthermore,
action at the local level provides an opportunity for a more focused, and per-
haps more effective, intervention. Local governments, because of their smaller
size and closeness to their constituents, have a sharper sense of communities
most impacted by the mortgage crisis and therefore may be able to address
these communities’ needs more directly and effectively than state and national
actors could.
To the extent the eminent domain plan helps to stabilize neighborhoods
and property values, the plan provides clear benefits to communities and to
homeowners.85 As is often the case, it is harder to predict the potential harms of
local action, but the most likely source of harm would come from the financial
sector, which could react to the use of eminent domain and the resulting uncer-
tainty about the terms of future real estate finance contracts by making mort-
gage financing more expensive or otherwise harder to obtain in some
communities.86 Communities that choose to exercise eminent domain may face
a focused reaction by national lenders. Similarly, if enough communities imple-
mented a similar plan, it is possible that lenders would react by changing the
terms of housing credit nationwide, rather than focusing a reaction on individ-
ual communities. Investors in current bundles of securitized loans could be
harmed by perceived and actual adjustments in the return on their
investments.87
action thresholds for two reasons. First, investors simply do not know who the other inves-
tors are in particular deals, and institutional investors tend to be quite secretive about their
investment positions. Second, tranching means that investors can have interests adverse to
each other. Super-senior tranches are unlikely to support demands for action because they
see no advantage in rocking the boat, while out-of-the-money junior tranches will only act if
they anticipate a sufficient likelihood that they will recover a portion of their claim.”).
84 See id. at 14 n.35.
85 Critics may point to the unfairness of benefiting homeowners when it is believed that
these homeowners’ own investment decisions, whether poorly timed or motivated by out-
sized greed, contributed to the housing crisis generally and the homeowner’s particular
underwater house. The harm, here, would be a psychic harm to those who think government
intervention unfair or those who think they made more responsible investment decisions and
are not being compensated for those good decisions by this plan.
86 Katya Wachtel, California Urges Fed Probe of Eminent Domain “Threats”, REUTERS
(Sept. 10, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/mortgages-eminent
domain-idUSL1E8KA4CX20120910 (describing California Lieutenant Governor Gavin
Newsom’s request of federal prosecutors to investigate investor attempts to boycott Califor-
nia communities that consider using eminent domain).
87 In a move reflective of these and other potential harms, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency requested public comment on this use of eminent domain, citing “significant con-
cerns.” Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652
(Aug. 9, 2012). (“FHFA has significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to revise
existing financial contracts and the alteration of the value of Enterprise or Bank securities
holdings. In the case of the Enterprises, resulting losses from such a program would
represent a cost ultimately borne by taxpayers. At the same time, FHFA has significant
concerns with programs that could undermine and have a chilling effect on the extension of
credit to borrowers seeking to become homeowners and on investors that support the hous-
ing market.”). Many financial and trade organizations, including the Association of Mort-
gage Investors, the primary trade association representing investors in mortgage-backed
securities, have opposed this use of eminent domain to acquire mortgages citing constitu-
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A related challenge to this proposed use of eminent domain involves valu-
ation, including how much local governments should pay for mortgage notes to
satisfy the just compensation requirement.88 Eminent domain actions to con-
demn mortgage notes would be accompanied by compensation to the underly-
ing note owners, but investors may view the particular compensation as
insufficient, or they may react to a sense of general uncertainty about the poten-
tial terms of condemnation for other notes.
The challenges and benefits of this eminent domain plan are difficult to
describe with certainty precisely because this application of eminent domain to
mortgage notes is without clear comparison to other examples of eminent
domain. As a result, local governments must weigh some risk of uncertainty
(the reaction of local residents and some components of the financial sector)
with the potential benefits (the opportunity for homeowners to refinance and
the revitalization of communities). While public and private actors at the
national and state level have debated and instituted ameliorative plans to
address the effects of the mortgage crisis, local governments have been rela-
tively absent from serious reform efforts. This use of eminent domain gives
local governments a significant tool to affect the resolution of the housing
crisis.
III. CONCLUSION
Nevada cities and the state legislature should carefully consider using emi-
nent domain to address the effects of the real estate and foreclosure crisis. It is a
new application of a traditional local power and, therefore, it is likely that there
will be questions about both its legality and propriety. While the Nevada statute
does not explicitly address the condemnation of mortgage notes, it does affirm
a broad application of eminent domain for public use. Furthermore, this novel
use of eminent domain power to condemn mortgage notes does not implicate
the same concerns raised by the traditional use of eminent domain to take real
property. Because of the magnitude and immediacy of the housing crisis in
Nevada, and the expansive definition of public use in the Nevada eminent
domain statute, cities should strongly consider using eminent domain to con-
demn the mortgage notes of underwater homes.
tional and business concerns. A coalition of organizations filed a comment with the FHFA
against this use of eminent domain. See Joint response letter from the Mortgage Bankers
Assoc. et al. to Alfred Pollard, Esq., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2012). See also Letter
from the Assoc. of Mortgage Investors to Alfred Pollard, Esq., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency
(Sept. 7, 2012) (in response to FHFA request for input, arguing that the use of eminent
domain “will likely curtail access to the thirty-year fixed mortgage, an integral part of the
American dream” and harm taxpayers through devaluation of their pensions, 401Ks, or
mutual funds).
88 The Nevada Constitution, amended by PISTOL, requires property to be valued at “its
highest and best use.” NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22, cl. 3. The Constitution also states that “just
compensation shall be defined as that sum of money, necessary to place the property owner
back in the same position, monetarily, without any governmental offsets, as if the property
had never been taken. Just compensation shall include, but is not limited to, compounded
interest and all reasonable costs and expenses actually incurred.” NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22, cl.
4.
